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Who would not be at a loss for words with such an introduction.
And who would not be tempted to apply a presumption of the law
that it was honest praise not flattery. There is a latent ambiguity
however, whether it was an introduction or an obituary. Particularly,
when I look about the room [in the Egyptian Gallery in the University of Pennsylvania Museum] and wonder whether the choice of this
location was symbolic, for we are gathered among mummies and I
could almost smell the spices and feel the winding cloth. But then I
think of the story about Justice Holmes at 90 walking with his friend
Justice Brandeis. As an attractive young lady passed them, Holmes
stopped, watched her walk away and then sighed,"Oh Louis, if I were
only seventy again." I am only seventy, and as Robert Browning's
Rabbi Ben Ezra said, "Grow old along with me, the best is yet to be.
The last of life for which the first was made.' Or as Robert Benchley, I believe, said. "It is too bad that youth is wasted on those too
young to appreciate it."
I have just recently discovered that Mr. Petersen [the outgoing
Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review] and I share a half-hidden past.
We both seriously considered becoming preachers but ended up in
the law. We had the same Genesis, made the same Exodus, and
ended up in Leviticus. There was a significant difference in that he
first went to Divinity School and I first went to Law School. In law
school he became an editor-in-chief; I became an assistant to the
minister. But after I started teaching I recognized its great advantages. What church could guarantee a congregation five or eight
times a week? And sometimes 100 or even 200 attentive listeners?

As many of you know, I have found the rostrum a bully pulpit from
which to preach. The one thing lacking is that I cannot take up a
collection-but the bursar is a more than adequate substitute. When
I was asked to contribute to tonight's dog and pony show, I told Mr.
Petersen, "I don't know that I have anything to say," to which he
kindly remarked, "That should be no problem for you." That is the
kind of response one ought not reflect on. My first thought was that
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after so many years I should be able to present some profound
thoughts on some grand theme. It is a memorable occasion calling
for a memorable speech. But then I thought of all the memorable
law review dinner speeches I have heard, including one of my own. I
discovered that I could not remember what any of them said. More
telling, I had no sense of loss for not remembering.
In searching for a topic, I asked senior editors for suggestions,
but none were helpful except one who said, "Don't try to say anything serious." I first took this to mean no one wanted a serious
speech. But later I remembered the exact words,"Don't try to say
anything serious," which suggested more about my capacities than
your expectations.
What would be appropriate and not serious? My first thought
was-and I always think of the title first-"A Pedagogue's Production; Students I Have Known." But the names that first came to
mind were Jerry Brown, Gary Hart, and Pat Robertson. The less said
about them the better. Indeed, I have no recollection of them as
students, even the yearbook pictures stir no recollections. Then I
thought of a title "Cave of the Winds: Faculty Meetings I Have Met."
This would certainly not be serious but the fall-out might be. I could
describe faculty meetings at Yale, but my present colleagues still
might think that this was only a thin disguise, for they might see
images of themselves. Faculty foibles are everywhere much the
same.
Then it occurred to me that a most appropriate subject would be
"A Worm's Eye View of Law Reviews: A Professor Looks at Student
Editors." What jolly fun! We could start with the Bluebook. In my
student days it was a 3 x 5 booklet of 20 pages. Today it has become
the student editor's bible, nearly as thick and not nearly so readable,
but followed religiously with fervent literalism. We might talk about
footnotes, a massive, if not profound subject. In your first issue
there were 1491 footnotes in 333 pages. What an achievement! But
Harvard's first issue won by a nose with 1559 footnotes in 355 pages.
Nothing is said in a law review without precise authority. In the
comment on "Shunning," the text states that the Bible says Adam
and Eve were thrown out of the Garden of Eden. This is supported
by citation, "Genesis 3:23-24. (Oxford annotated Bible rev. standard
version.)" Without the footnote we migh have suspected the author
himself invented the story. A reference to the First Amendment is
supported with the footnote "U.S. Const amend I." Otherwise we
might not know where to find it. I marvel at the passion for precision
with fertile footnotes which reproduce themselves. Consider the
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fecundity of a single authority to breed 10 footnotes. The parent
note,"564 P.2d 71," produced in rapid succession, See id. at 72, See id.
at 72-73, See id. at 73, Id. at 75-76, See id. at 75, 77, See id. at 74-75, Id.
at 76, See id., See id. I started to count the "ids" in a single comment
and decided it would be idiotic. I make no comment on those who
put them there.
This student editor devotion to footnotes and their accuracy can
have a disconcerting turn for mere author. Two law reviews rejected
an article of mine dealing with Swedish law because they could not
check the footnotes. The first had no one on the Review who could
read Swedish, the second had someone who could read Swedish, but
learned that some of the material was available only in Sweden. My
word was not enough, they had to have proof positive. The article
was ultimately published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
but only after substantial agonizing by the Board over the risks to
their credibility. I can imagine some two or ten years hence some
curious Swedish reader looks up a footnote, finds it wrong, turns to
the masthead and says, "What kind of articles editor was she?" It
would be nice for an author to know that someone else will be
blamed for his mistakes.
A more disconcerting penchant of articles editors is to rewrite
the author's work. Their objectivity, untroubled by a surplus of substantive knowledge, enables them to know better than the author
what is important and how to say it. Their anointed function is to
make a silk purse from a sow's ear, and you know what that makes
the author.
But student editors have earned their comeuppance.
Authors, now knowing that student editors will rewrite in any
case send in sows ears. They send first drafts or only drafts of first
drafts. And knowing that associate editors love finding footnotes,
leave them to be filled out by the second year slaves. This, of course,
inflates the self-importance of articles editors who produce what, to
them, are silk purses.
But there is a fallout of which you are not aware. When we are
hiring new faculty, we look to what they have published. If the articles editors have been mediocre, the candidate will not get the job.
That result brings me no tears. But if the articles are good, we do
not know whether to hire the candidate or the articles editor. And if
the candidate was a former articles editor, we never examine the articles he rewrote and published under another name. The reason is
obvious. Faculty members have a vested interest in preserving the
myth that the articles are written by the faculty member.
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I decided not to talk on law reviews lest I say something ungracious on this most gracious occasion. But I still needed a subject for
my speech. Then I remembered a poem "The Calf Path"-footnote
"Anonymous"-and thought I would see where that might lead.
THE COW PATH
One day thru the primeval wood

A calf walked home, as good calves should
But made a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail, as all calves do.
Since then one hundred years have fled,
And I infer, the calf is dead;
But still behind he left his trail,
And thereon hangs my moral tale.
The trail was taken up next day
By a lone cow that passed that way;
And then a wise bell-weather sheep
Pursued the trail o'er dale and steep,
And drew the flock behind him, too,
As good bell-weathers always do.
And from that day o'er hill and glade
Thru those old woods a path was made.
And many men wound in and out,
And dodged and turned and bent about,
And uttered words of righteous wrath
Because 'twas such a crooked path;
But still they follow - do not laugh

-

The first migrations of that calf.
The forest path became a lane
That bent and turned and turned again;
The years passed on in swiftness fleet,
The village road became a street,
And this, before men were aware,
A city's crowded thoro-fare.
Today a modern thoughtless throng
Follow this zigzag calf along;
A hundred-thousand men are led
By one poor calf, the century's dead.
Forjust such reverence is lent
To well established precedent.

A moral lesson this might teach
Were I ordained and called to preach,
For men are prone to go it blind
Along the calf paths of the mind;
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And judges keep the law askew
Because they will not think anew.
They blindly follow precedents
Regardless of their common sense.
The path of law they will not move;
Once made it is a sacred groove.
Oh how the wise old wood gods laugh
Who watched the first primeval calf.
Yes many things this tale might teach
But I am not ordained to preach.
Holmes once said, "The life of the law is not logic but experience."
Footnote "Common Law 1880." But the experience which is given
most weight in the law is precedent. And precedent means looking
backward to where we have been rather than looking forward to
where we should go, like a firefly with the light on the wrong end.
Some have said that the appropriate symbol of the law is a dead duck
flying backwards, going north in November and South in April.
We have been so long steeped-or is it the proper metaphor
stewed-in precedent that we are scarcely aware that .the life of the
law too often is neither logic nor experience, but precedent, and it
becomes increasingly so. Look about yourselves for a moment for
the signs.
Think of the endless shelves of published court reports. The
Federal Reports alone add 50 volumes, 75,000 pages each year.
Since we have been celebrating here 30 pages of new federal cases
have been written. New York Supplement produces 13 volumes with
12,000 pages each year. Reports from the 50 states is but the beginning, for there are reports of decisions by the NLRB, the ICC, the
SEC, the EEOC, and on until the alphabet is worn thin with overwork. If all the volumes of reports were laid side by side they would
pave a road to-not Heaven, but perhaps to Hell, and not only
because it is closer.
And why do we have all these published reports-certainly not
to benefit from the wisdom of the judges, for the sparse grains of
wisdom are buried in the chaff of empty repetitions. We collect these
reports, and pay West well for its cramped printing and misleading
headnotes, because we want them for precedents. Senior partners,
confronted by a problem, send their slaves searching for precedents
to support their advices to clients, and their opinion letters. Lawyer's briefs are larded with citations to support their logic, or to disguise their lack of logic. Judges examine the cases cited to guide or
excuse their decisions, or to justify an admittedly inexcusable result.
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The law reviews then comment on decisions adding the lead of string
citations in 200 footnotes.
There was a time when I hoped that so many cases would be
reported, with so many palpably foolish decisions that they would
lose value like paper money when too much was printed. Lawyers
and judges might cease searching for the case "on all fours," with
realization that such a case would be more likely decided by a nameless pedant than a Mansfield, a Cardozo, or a Traynor. But West,
always willing to be helpful, produced Westlaw and saved lawyers,
judges, and law reviews from the agony of rethinking. With a few
deft punches of shrewdly selected key words, all is immediately made
visible on the screen, whose presented idiocies are outnumbered
only by commercial television. Westlaw and Lexis are the technological age's altar to precedent worship.
And what of law professors? We initiate and perpetuate both
the reality and myth of precedent. The first thing law students are
taught is how to read a case. We drill students in finding the "holding" of a case, to sort out "dictum," and to distinguish other cases.
We play the hidden ball game of hypotheticals, real or unreal, and
bedevil students with the question of how the holding would apply.
In short, what is the precedent value of the case. The inarticulate
premise is that the decided case is not to be questioned. It is a given
from which we proceed to determine how other cases are to be
decided. Students unconsciously embrace this comforting premise,
and accept the decided case as "the law" and the starting point of
inquiry. This habit of analyzing without reflecting is reinforced by
our casebooks, for the cases selected are predominantly those which
the author-more accurately case collector or law garbage pickerbelieves or hopes represents "the law."
Law professors are, of course, blameless. They are only doing
their job. They train lawyers to search for and select precedents, in
order to persuade judges who declare themselves bound by precedents, because their professors have taught them the importance of
precedents. The snake swallows its tail and it makes no difference
whether professors are the head or the tail. All are innocent fellow
stumblers in the rutted calf-path of precedent.
I overstate, of course. We, at times, protest the rut, point out
there may be other ways, and even dare at times to leave the rut. But
we cannot ignore the burden of the dead hand of the past. Consider
that the Statute of Frauds has remained substantially unchanged for
300 years, when from the beginning even its name was misdirected.
Still today a contract to build an apartment house need not be in
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writing, but the builder's contract to buy bricks must be in writing, as
must the lease of a single apartment. An annuity for life need not be
in writing but a contract to make three annual payments must be in
writing. Such oddities have no justification other than it was so
decided in the times of Charles II. Again, the wise old wood gods
must be *drunkwith laughter with the judicial meandering of Foakes v.
Baer. To be sure, precedent does not preclude all progress in the
law. But it took 120 years for the law to move from Winterbottom v.
Wright to Hennigson v. Bloomfield Motors. And we count Cardozo's
opinion in McPherson v. Buck a work of genius when he reached a
result obvious to any sensible person unburdened by precedent.
The misconceived doctrine of employment at will, sired by a slip of
text writers pen, was followed blindly for 100 years. And even now
the New York Court of Appeals, whose decisions nurtured the doctrine in infancy, says that its obvious unjustness can be corrected
only by the legislature, for the court is bound by its precedents.
To what end does this bowing to the Ball of Precedent lead? It
may provide stability in the law, but too often it is the stability of
petrification from which life is long since gone. Because the decided
cases provide premises which we do not question, we are shielded
from the pain of doubts. We shape and fit those precedents to form
what we ascribe the oxymoron, a system of law.
The most corrosive consequence of devotion to precedent is
that it reinforces our natural reluctance to question that which is,
rather than to quest for what might be. I fear that our training to
find the law in cases and statues circumscribes our imagination. We
build a structure of law with building blocks of the past and are
imprisoned therein. We learn and teach the skills to rationalize what
has been decided, and thereby dull our ability to see our present
failures or to see new solutions.
We pride ourselves that lawyers are trained to solve problems,
and so they are. But the training is too often to find solutions within
the existing framework, not to question premises and imagine new
structures. There is more than class hostility in the old statement
that if you want to make a revolution, you must first kill all the lawyers. They are too burdened by the past of their own creation.
Having set forth a problem, I should in the established tradition
of the law review, visible in articles and student comments alike, provide a solution. I am sorry to disappoint you, but I have no solution.
But I am not overly concerned. Some student editor seeking a comment topic, or some teacher seeking tenure will sooner or later pro-
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pose a solution, fully footnoted, and, if fate is kind, someone may
read it.
I have one small suggestion which I am prepared to expand into
a major commercial; a commercial on behalf of your cinderella sister
journals of business and labor comparative law, which are relegated
to the dark and dingy basement in the furthest reaches from the
library.
For those of us of little imagination, or whose wits have been
dulled by reading too many cases, study of comparative law can help
us loosen the chains of our legal training. From the perspective of
other systems, if we will mentally leave home long enough to obtain
a perspective, we may see flaws or failings of our own system of
which we were never aware. We might recognize as unnecessary
oddities principles or premises which we have taken for granted or,
assumed were universal truism. In labor law we assume that a system
of collective bargaining could not function without exclusive representation, that the right of an employer to operate during a strike is
fundamental, and that secondary boycotts are mortal sins. But study
of other systems make us realize that these are American oddities,
like the constitutional right to buy assault guns.
In studying other systems we might find inspiration for solutions
to needs which we have provincially ignored, like employment-atwill. We might see beyond the easily accepted wisdom of those with
little learning who insist that legal rules cannot be transplanted to
other bodies of law. We might recognize that transplants are often
the life of the law. Every industrialized country now has statutory
protection against unjust discharge, all following the lead of a German statute of the Weimar Republic.
If you have listened carefully and followed my subtle logic,
neither of which have I the right to expect, you will be saying to
yourself, "That is simple minded, the product of a poor legal education. Precedent is not confining, it dictates no result. You need only
know how to massage the legal material to reach any result you
wish." If you have been muttering this to yourself you are at least
half right.
We no sooner teach you to state the holding of a case than we
teach you to whittle the holding down to a sliver, and at the same
time to construct broad premises or assumptions on which one can
argue the decision rests. If you seek a certain result, you emphasize
the similarities of the decisions in your favor and the distinctions of
the cases against you. If no cases support you on the facts you quote
dictum, and if you can't find dictum you can quote a law review. This
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you learn by the end of the first year and repeat it ad tedium for two
more years. This is what is sometimes described as teaching students to think like a lawyer. It might better be described as learning
to make a noise like a lawyer.
This training to massage the legal material is, of course, essential, for it is the livelihood of the lawyer. It is the prose for persuading the judges, and essential for a judge explaining a decision.
Precedent is seldom confining if you know the result you seek. With
the plethora of decided cases, a well sharpened legal mind, strategic
selection, and a bit of imagination you should seldom be at a loss for
a plausible argument.
What is missing, however, when one recognizes the nearly infinite pliability of precedents, and how they may be made to point in
many directions, is that precedents do not tell you what end to seek.
For a lawyer, this is little problem; the client defines the desired
results. But if this is all we teach and all you learn, then lawyers are
little more than plastic persons, legal eunuchs.
Students all too quickly enjoy the intellectual game of constructing arguments and counter-arguments, with no concern for, much
less commitment to, the result. How often do we hear "It could be
argued" followed by a string of verbally plausible phrases. But at the
end, if we ask, "Do you really like that result? Is that the kind of
world you want to live in?" The ingenious arguers have no answer.
Indeed, they act as if the question is not fair, that it is not within the
rules of the game, that it trenches too close on what is right or
wrong, a question for a philosopher or a preacher, not a lawyer
whose function is to serve his or her client's interest.
But should not lawyers be more than hired guns, and should we
not teach much more than target practice? Should we not look less
to what cases hold than what they ought to hold, to ask less what the
law is than what it should be? Ought not law school contain more a
search for justice than for cleverness? When we look about us, if we
have eyes to see, must we not be appalled by gross inequalities, desperate poverty in the midst of conspicuous consumption, private
power using property rights to oppress, indifference to unfairness
and man's inhumanity to man? Surely the law should speak to this.
Surely the law schools should teach to this. Surely, we should not
send students out into this world with the legal tools we give them
without making them search for themselves with the question, "What
is required of me' what do I require of myself?"
With apologies to your past editor-in-chief, let me draw from the
prophet Micah: "You have seen what is good. And what is required
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of you but to do justice, and to love kindness and walk humbly with
your God." Micah, 6:8
This but puts the painful question. How shall we know what is
just when confronted with competing claims? How shall we work
kindness in a world of scarce resources? When precedent is no
longer a guide, by what stars shall we steer? What values should we
hold most dear, what goals are worth seeking? We are forced to the
agony of uncertain choice. We search for principles and develop
theories from which logic will lead to right results, to escape the
agony of choice. Thus the appeal to neutral principles-but neutral
as to what? Thus the appeal to economics which, if we ignore the
untamed qualification of market failure, will "tend" to give us certain
answers. But economics can tell us nothing more than what is efficient, it cannot tell us what is just or kind. It considers no values but
goods or money. It is the modem theology of Mammon. What we
seek is much more, the good society.
It is not for us to teach to tell students what their values should
be. We could not, if we would, impose our own. But should we not
press students to search within themselves to find those values, and
to examine the cases and legal rules according to those values?
Should we not test their assumptions so they may see the values
which are implied? And if we are to do this, should we portray ourselves as neuters unable or unwilling to choose between values, treat
every view of equal weight, every argument plausibly stated equally
valid? Two years ago when I read my labor law evaluations-some
written by some of you-I was first disturbed by comments that I was
biased. But on reflection, I found comfort. Far better to be seen as
biased than to be seen as a person of no beliefs. As I have said, for
me the platform is a bully pulpit, not to persuade students any special set of values but to make them search for and apply their own
values to the legal problems before them.
Many times, at the end of a class, the end of a week, the end of a
semester or when I sit at graduation, I ask myself, what have we
taught these students? Have we taught them to be sensitive or only
smart? Will society be better off for what they have learned, or worse
off because their client's interests run against society's better interests. Have they increased their sense of responsibility for the world
about them, and a sense of direction in dealing with it, or have we
only made them more useful for the law firms to whom they sell
themselves?
As I stated at the beginning, the life of the law is precedent,
whether following the calf-path of the past or bending the path to
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serve a client. But the life of the lawyer should be something more,
to search within themselves for answers which precedents cannot
provide, to go beyond the question what does the case hold and why,
to ask what is good, what is just, what is kind.

